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Abstract
This paper studies the impact of Eurosystem Governing Council com-
munication on ﬁnancial markets’ interest rate expectations based on ev-
idence from bond markets, futures markets and options markets. First,
we ﬁnd that the level, the dispersion and the asymmetry of interest rate
expectations are aﬀected on Council meeting days. However, such eﬀects
may be relatively short-lived. Moreover, we ﬁnd that interest rate expec-
tations tend to become less volatile during the black out period. Second,
monetary policy meetings tend to aﬀect interest rate expectations much
more strongly than data releases. Third, whereas the impact of mon-





2 years, the eﬀect of euro area data releases on
rate expectations seem to unfold in a more evenly distributed manner at
longer horizons as well. Fourth, keywords may foster the (very) short-run
predictability of the Eurosystem monetary policy. However, keywords do
not seem to have a systematic impact on interest rate expectations over
longer horizons.
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21 Introduction
Communication has become an important part of today’s monetary policy.
Apart from its obvious role with regard to the accountability of monetary pol-
icy, ”management of expectations”1 has become an important ingredient of
academic thinking on the eﬃency of monetary policy. On the one hand, as
highlighted by Lucas (1976), the extent to which monetary policy actions are
anticipated is key to their impact. On the other hand, as emphasised by Blinder
(1998), monetary policy is inﬂuential only to the point that it shapes econom-
ically important variables like longer term interest rates. With the nominal
overnight rate being the only rate directly under control by the central bank,
monetary authorities can foster the link between this instrument and longer-
term interest rates by communicating on the course of monetary policy.2
However, as several studies suggest, central banks need to communicate care-
fully. For example, Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2005, 2007b) claim that central
banks should clearly distinguish between statements on the course of monetary
policy and statements on a more general economic outlook. Moreover, D’Amato,
Morris, and Shin (2003) argue that central bank communication may become
”too eﬀective”. If a central bank is very successful in shaping expectations,
and as a result, in shaping the market outcome, market participants might ne-
glect other sources of information about the underlying state of the economy.
D’Amato, Morris, and Shin conclude that a central bank ”[has] to recognize the
inherent limitations in any disclosure and to guard against the potential damage
done by noise.” Most importantly, Eurosystem monetary policy is conditional
on a broad assessment of the outlook for risks to price stability and its underlying
assumptions and scenarios. This conditionality might not be fully understood
by market participants and forward guidance over the medium term might be
mis-interpreted as a precommitment by the central bank to a speciﬁc interest
rate trajectory even in the emergence of scenarios diﬀerent from the benchmark.
Although perfectly justiﬁed, deviations from the expected policy path, may be
mis-interpreted as a policy failure and ultimately lead to lower credibility of the
central bank.
The empirical literature proposes several methods to assess the impact of
central bank communication on ﬁnancial markets. For example, Heinemann
and Ullrich (2005) and Gerlach (2004) try to assess the informational content
of statements of central bank oﬃcials. However, as stressed by Brand, Buncic,
and Turunen (2006), in the absence of an obvious way to identify the marginal
informational content of central bank statements, it is particularly diﬃcult to
quantify the signal contained within such statements. Another strand of liter-
ature (e.g. Andersson (2007) and Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007a)) focusses
on the announcement eﬀects of monetary policy decisions and surrounding in-
formation as measured by ﬁnancial market reactions around the time of their
communication to the general public. Such studies typically conﬁrm the ex-
istence of announcement eﬀects, but they cannot provide policy makers with
precise estimates of the qualitative impact of communication (including the ex-
istence of asymmetries, non-linearities, etc.). Overall, this strand of literature
typically focuses on the impact of communication on market expectations of the
level of money market rates.
1See Woodford (2003).
2Woodford (1999).
3The present paper studies the impact of oﬃcial ECB Governing Council
communication on several segments of euro area ﬁnancial markets not only
with regard to the average level of rate expectations, but also with regard to
the distribution of such market expectations around this average and the term
structure of rate expectations. For this purpose, the remainder of this paper is
organised into three sections:
In section 2, we investigate the eﬀects of ECB Governing Council commu-
nication on the level and the distribution of market expectations. For this
purpose, we use indicators of market expectations derived from implied risk
neutral densities (RNDs hereafter).
In section 3 we estimate implicit instantaneous forward rates to assess the
impact of communication across the term structure of interest rates. By linking
daily instantaneous forward rates to ECB Governing Council communication, we
try to identify the horizon at which the communication of the monetary policy
decision impacts on ﬁnancial markets. Especially, a distinction can be made
between short-term predictability and more long-term ”forward guidance”.
Moreover, in assessing the impact of Governing Council communication, the
paper also investigates the eﬀect of a small set of keywords often referred to
in the media as the ”traﬃc light system”.3 To maintain a close link between
communication measures and their impact on ﬁnancial markets while, avoiding
too noisy signals in the estimation, both RNDs and implied forward rates are
estimated using daily data.4 Throughout this section, the period under study
is from mid-July 2005 to mid-July 2007. The aim of the paper is to give a
comprehensive overview of the impact of oﬃcial ECB Governing Council com-
munication on the level of interest rate expectations, on the dispersion and the
(a)symmetry of such expectations as well as on the term structure of market
expectations. In all sections, we try to compare the impact of oﬃcial Governing
Council communication to the eﬀects of data releases for the euro area and the
US.
2 Evidence from risk-neutral densities
2.1 Estimating risk-neutral densities
In general, expectations with regard to the level of money-market interest rates
can be directly derived from interest rates futures contracts. For example, Eu-
ribor futures contracts are typically considered a particularly important instru-
ment within the euro area. Given the institutional arrangements governing their
listing on the LIFFE stock exchange, for any given Euribor futures contracts
price Fmat, the average level of implied money-market rates at maturity can be
determined as Y ieldF = 100 − Fmat.
However, futures prices are useful primarily for extracting average market
expectations with regard to the path of expected future short-term rates, and
therefore expectations regarding monetary policy, over time. Going beyond a
simple point estimate, however, futures prices do not provide information on the
3In the media the ”traﬃc light system” is frequently narrowed down to four explicit ”code-
words” i.e. vigilance, monitoring closely, still accommodative and further withdrawal.
4For a more detailed analysis of the impact of keywords based on intraday evidence, please
consult the upcoming article Announcement eﬀects of the Eurosystem monetary policy: Evi-
dence from intraday data” in the BCL Bulletin.
4distribution of expectations around the average level or the degree of uncertainty
related to expectations with regard to future interest rate levels. The analysis
of Euribor futures trading can be enhanced by the analysis of option prices. In
particular, under the assumption of risk neutrality, risk neutral densities (RND)
can be used to extract the market’s perception of the probability distribution
of the price of an underlying asset at the future date when the option expires.
By identifying the full distribution of expectations of future short-term nominal
rates, option price data may help to estimate the probability market partici-
pants attach to a certain range of interest rate levels at some future point in
time, the dispersion of such interest rate expectations around their average, the
probability attached to speciﬁc changes in these levels (such as a 25 bps interest
rate hike), asymmetries and the risks attached to extreme changes in interest
rate levels.
The estimation of RNDs is based on the option pricing theory pioneered
by Fisher Black, Myron Scholes and Robert Merton in 1973. Their model has
become the standard in pricing European call and put options on non-dividend
paying stocks. Under the assumptions of their model, stock prices are log-
normally distributed and the return of the stock is normally distributed with
constant variance.5 In their path-breaking paper, Black and Scholes (1973)
showed that, for any given point in time t, prices of European call and put op-
tions on non-dividend paying stocks maturing at time T depend on the exercise
price X, on the price of the underlying asset S at time t, on the remaining time
to maturity t−T, on the expected volatility of the price of the underlying asset
over the period t − T and on the risk-free rate of interest i. Importantly, the
resulting option price formulae do not involve any variable aﬀected by the risk
preferences of investors. With option prices being unaﬀected by risk preferences,
any set of risk preferences can be used when evaluating option prices formulae.
In particular, the simple assumption that investors are risk neutral can be made,
implying that in the absence of arbitrage opportunities, the expected return on
all securities is the risk-free rate of interest and the present value of future pay-
oﬀs can easily be obtained by discounting their expected value at the risk free
rate.
Since its publication in 1973, the Black-Scholes model has been extended to
allow for the valuation of options on underlying assets other than non-dividend
paying stocks, such as on foreign exchange, on indices, and on futures contracts.6
The most prominent model used when pricing options on futures, including
options whose payoﬀs depend on the value of the interest rate, is Black (1976).
Building on the properties of the 1973 Black-Scholes model, the absence of
riskless arbitrage opportunities requires that the futures’ price F0 = ertS0.
In analogy to the non-dividend paying stock price, it is assumed that futures
prices follow a geometric Brownian motion (log-normal distribution). The Black
5The assumptions of the model require the price of the underlying asset to follow a geo-
metric Brownian motion. Further on, it is assumed that short selling of securities with full
use of proceeds is permitted, that there are no transaction costs and that securities are per-
fectly divisible. Moreover, they exclude riskless arbitrage opportunities, and consider security
trading continuous. See, for example, Hull (1997).
6See Black and Scholes (1973) and Hull (1997).
5(1976) pricing formulae for options on futures are given by:
C = S0N(d1) − Xe−rτN(d2) (1)
P = Xe
−rτN(−d2) − S0N(−d1) (2)
where:
d1 =




d2 = d1 − σ
√
τ
with σ now referring to the volatility of the futures price.
Admittedly, in practice, the analysis of option prices in the spirit of Black-
Scholes is subject to a number of potentially important caveats. For example,
to the extent that investors do not adhere to genuine risk neutrality, in the
presence of aggregate risk in the market, risk neutral densities may diﬀer from
the market’s true perception of the probability distribution. However, the as-
sumption of pure risk neutrality can be weakened without a general loss of the
meaning of the results obtained. For example, as pointed out by Rubinstein
(1994), under the assumption of constant relative risk aversion, the true distri-
bution will shift to the right, but will leave the shape of the distribution almost
unchanged. As the focus of this paper is on changes in market expectations,
rather than on simple estimates of the level, we consider (changes in) the distri-
butions obtained under the assumption of risk neutrality a reasonable indicator
of changes in the market’s perception.
Furthermore, empirical analyses of option prices (e.g. Rubinstein (1994))
have often contested, the assumption of stock prices being log-normally dis-
tributed with constant variance. Critics claim that stock returns are more
peaked and display tails heavier than suggested by the lognormal distribution.
Under the assumptions of the Black-Scholes model, the implied volatility is
expected to be constant across diﬀerent strike prices for options on a given
underlying asset and with identical remaining time to maturity. In practice,
however, implied volatilities tend to diﬀer both across diﬀerent strike prices
and across maturities.7 The shape of the volatility pattern, in particular its
convexity and its slope, has important implications for the speciﬁcation of the
distribution of markets’ expectations, and its deviation from the benchmark
log-normal distribution.8 In order to overcome the issue of returns not being
normally distributed with constant mean and variance, RND’s can be estimated
using a speciﬁc parametric form for the implied distribution other than a stan-
dard single log-normal distribution. The parameters of the speciﬁcation can
then be estimated by ﬁtting theoretical option prices to observed prices. The
literature on RNDs has explored alternative and more ﬂexible functional forms
for estimating implied density functions based on prices of European options,
7More speciﬁcally, with regard to strike prices, the implied volatility tends to exhibit a
speciﬁc pattern often referred to as ”volatility smile”, implying that the implied volatility is
particularly high for in-the-money calls and out-of-the money puts.
8For example, on the one hand, a negatively sloped volatility curve with regard to the
strike price, ceteris paribus, implies a positively skewed distribution. On the other hand,
strong convexity of the volatility pattern ceteris paribus implies fatter tails relative to the
log-normal distribution.
6ranging from a weighted combination of multiple independent log-normal distri-
butions, generalized gamma and exponential distributions to techniques directly
based on the observed pattern of implied volatility.9
In this paper, risk neutral densities are derived using a double log-normal
distribution which oﬀers substantially more degrees of ﬂexibility than the single
log-normal distribution. The double log-normal distribution has become stan-
dard in the analysis of RNDs. Admittedly, a number of studies proposed to
extract implied RNDs by assuming a weighted sum of three log-normal distri-
butions (e.g. Melick and Thomas (1997)). However, by extending the analysis
from 2 to 3 log-normal distributions, the number of parameters to be estimated
increases more than proportionally from 5 to 8. Accordingly, the identiﬁcation
of three log-normal distributions requires a suﬃciently large number of strike
prices (i.e. at a given point in time t, the number of observations per time to
maturity). In our case, the number of strike prices may be as large as 20 on
some days and for some maturities, but falls to 12 for speciﬁc dates and/or in
the event of implausible option price data. Also, given the high frequency at
which implied distributions are estimated in this paper, it is essential to allow
for a speciﬁcation which yields reasonably good solutions for a large number of
cases without frequent case-speciﬁc interventions. Moreover, the combination
of two log-normal distributions is in general able to reproduce common features
in option pricing, such as skewness and fat tails (see Figure 1 below).
As in other studies for the euro area, in this section, we estimate money-
market interest rate expectations from price data on 3-month Euribor futures
traded on LIFFE. These futures are among the most actively traded euro area
money-market instruments. Given their high degree of liquidity, data on pricing
and trading activity on 3-month Euribor futures meet high quality standards
and are available at high frequency. The following analysis uses daily pricing
data as reported by Bloomberg newswire services. With options being written
on diﬀerent Euribor futures contracts (i.e. diﬀerent maturities), a distribution
of interest rate expectations can be derived for various future points in time.
Options are available on a number of 3-month Euribor futures contracts, the
most liquid of which oﬀer 4 maturity dates per year (March, June, September
and December) and cover a horizon of around 2 years.
Given our assumption of a double log-normal distribution, the theoretical












2N(−d3) − XN(−d4)]} (4)
with:
9In his comparative analysis, Jackwerth (1999) highlighted that in spite of very diﬀerent
settings, these methods yield quite similar risk neutral densities unless the number of option
prices available is very small.












Choice of double log−normal distributions with E[X] = 4
Figure 1: ’Implied risk-neutral densities’ with identical mean
d1 =
−ln(X) + α1 + β2
1
β1
, d2 = d1 − β1
d3 =
−ln(X) + α2 + β2
2
β2
, d4 = d3 − β2
The estimation procedure consists in selecting the parameters of the distri-
bution so as to minimise the cumulated squared deviation between the observed
option prices and theoretical option prices. In the absence of arbitrage oppor-
tunities and under the assumption of risk neutrality, the futures price for the
underlying asset should coincide with the mean of the implied distribution. This
requirement is implemented in the optimization algorithm by augmenting the
euclidian distance by the squared deviation between the observed futures price
and the implied mean of the distribution such that the optimization can be























To avoid potential local minima, the optimisation procedure involves ﬁve
steps. In a ﬁrst and a second step, we deﬁne a grid of θ parameters spanning
the interval [0.01, 0.99]. Using a small grid (i.e interval 0.02), we optimise on all
α and β parameters for a fairly large number of θs. In step 1, for any given time
t, we apply mean starting values based on the observed futures price. In step
10An alternative approach to implement the mean requirement would be to include the
mean conditionality directly in the optimization as a constraint. However, this constraint
might become binding and thereby unduly restrict the set of solutions, Arils (2002).
82 starting values are set to the optimal parameters obtained for the preceding
trading day t−1. In step 3, a narrow grid of θ parameters is applied based on the
5 best solutions obtained in steps 1 and 2. The total number of optimisations
in step 3 is 50. In step 4, based on the optimal parameters obtained for the
previous day, we optimise on all 5 parameters simultaneously.11 Finally, in step
5, based on the optimal solution obtained from all previous steps, we optimise
on all 5 parameters.
2.2 Summary indicators of interest rate expectations
The RND summary statistics used as indicators in this paper are the mean of
the implied distribution, its standard deviation, selected interquantile ranges of
this distribution (both used as a proxy for dispersion of expectations) and a
measure of asymmetry related to the probability market participants attach to
a rate rise and to a rate reduction of a speciﬁc size.
As a proxy for the level of money market rate expectations we use the mean
of the implied distribution, which at time t, for a given futures contract with





In the absence of arbitrage opportunities and under the assumption of risk
neutrality, the mean of the distribution should coincide with the futures price of
the underlying asset. Variation in the underlying market expectations is proxied
by the standard deviation of the implied risk-neutral density, which at time t,





For the purpose of robustness, we also consider speciﬁc interquantile ranges
of the implied distribution (e.g. 65th-35th percentile and 75th-25th percentile)
as alternative measures of rate expectations variation. We also use two com-
plementary measures of asymmetry of rate expectations. At any given point in







Alternatively, the asymmetry of rate expectations is measured as the likeli-
hood of a rate hike and of a rate reduction. More speciﬁcally, changes in the
probability of a 25 bps (50 bps) rate hike and a 25 (50 bps) bps rate reduction
relative to the current futures price are computed.
2.3 Evidence from RND summary indicators
In estimating RNDs, we require a minimum frequency of price change when
selecting the options to be considered in the estimation.12 The working as-
sumption is that, all else equal, for a given type of option, a higher frequency of
11Steps 1 and 4 are not applied to the ﬁrst day of the reference period.
12More speciﬁcally, for any given option (i.e. speciﬁc strike price for a given futures contract)
we require the daily closing price to change in four out of ﬁve days at least.
9price change reﬂects a higher degree of liquidity. Moreover, as options close to
maturity tend to become rather illiquid and usually change very little in price,
observations with a term to maturity of less than 30 days were dropped. For
all RND-based summary indicators presented in 2.2, ﬁxed-eﬀects regressions of
the following form were carried out:
RNDIndit = β0 +
4 X
j=1
βjtRNDIndit−j + β5tID ISt







t + ui + eit, (7)
with RNDIndit denoting the RND-based indicators on the level, the dis-
persion and the asymmetry of rate expectations and ui denoting the maturity-




t ) denote proxies for the duration
until the next (since the preceding) Governing Council meeting. In general, we
ﬁnd a relatively high degree of persistence with the sum of autoregressive coeﬃ-
cents typically in the interval [0.8;0.9] (save futures price change). Whereas the
strong autoregressive component suggests a relatively limited role for genuine
exogenous factors, it also reﬂects that risk-neutral densities (and developments
therein) are generally stable.
Nevertheless, the RND summary indicators are subject to estimation error.
Their use as dependent variables in equation (7) may therefore yield biased
parameter estimates. For the purpose of robustness, an alternative speciﬁcation
is used giving less weight to the exact magnitude of the RND-based summary
indicators. Instead, for a given RND-based indicator RNDIndi, we use a panel
logit ﬁxed-eﬀects model based on a boolean variable which depends on whether
in period t indicator i exceeds its average (i.e. yit=1) or not (i.e. yit=0):
yit =
￿
1 ifxit ≥ ¯ xi
0 otherwise with: Pr[yit = 1] =
xitβ+ui+eit
1+xitβ+ui+eit, where:
xitβ = β0 +
4 X
j=1
βjtRNDIndit−j + β5tID ISt







t + ui + eit, (8)
Figure 2 below illustrates the developments in the key RND summary indi-
cators on the level of rate expectations, the dispersion of expectations and the
asymmetry of expectations over the period under study. For the sake of clar-
ity, the illustration refers to a speciﬁc Euribor futures contract (i.e. ERM08,
maturity date: 14 June 2008). The minimum bid rate for main reﬁnancing op-
erations is illustrated by the upper panel of Figure 2 below. The starting date is
set to 14 june 2006 as no price quotes for options on this futures contract were
observed prior to this date. The upper middle panel describes generally upward
trending (though not necessarily continuously rising) expectations of the level
of money-market rates. Interestingly, the level of money-market rates expected
for mid-2008 continued to rise until the end of the reference period, i.e. approx-
imately 3 weeks prior to the emergence of ﬁnancial market turbulences related
13For the purpose of this exercise, the maturity is expressed in months.
10to the US real estate sub-prime market. Given the mid-2008 maturity date, by
the end of our reference period the rise in money-market rate level expectations
are likely to reﬂect rising policy rates rather than anxieties related to a potential
liquidity shortfall.14 The lower middle panel illustrates the declining dispersion
of money-market rate expectations over time, suggesting a general fall in the
degree of uncertainty as the time to maturity declines. Finally, the lower panel
of Figure 2 below illustrates the expected probability of an increase in interest
rates by 25 basis points relative to the current price of the futures contract.
Increased volatility around the june 2007 rate hike possibly reﬂects shocks to
expectations related to the upcoming ﬁnancial market tensions. Overall, expec-
tations of rate increases start to strengthen around this time. However, this may













Dispersion of rate expectations: ERM 2008




Expectations of a 25 basis points increase: ERM 2008
Figure 2: Key RND summary indicators for ERM08
The level of money market interest rate expectations
Our results with regard to the level of interest rate expectations suggest that
changes to interest rate expectations (again, measured in absolute terms), tend
to narrow ﬁve trading days ahead of a Governing Council meeting. Smaller price
changes might suggest that market participants align themselves ahead of mon-
etary policy decisions. Moreover, the signiﬁcantly smaller price changes might
be a result of the black out period. During this period, which starts one week
ahead of Eurosystem Governing Council meetings, no information on Eurosys-
tem monetary policy deliberations may be provided to the general public.15 By
contrast, changes to the expected level of money market rates are not signiﬁ-
cantly diﬀerent throughout the week following a Council meeting. Furthermore,
we ﬁnd that the pronounciation of a keyword by itself has no substantial impact
on the level of expectations. There is some preliminary evidence that keywords
14Futures prices suggest that, initially, market participants considered the ﬁnancial turbu-
lences to be transient and expected them to recede within a couple of months
15The complete regression results can be consulted in tables 2 and 3 in appendix B.1.
11may signiﬁcantly add to the change in the level of rate expectations when pro-
nounced jointly. However, this ﬁnding is not particularly robust. It is driven
by a small number of observations and might reﬂect the strong correlation of
keywords with Governing Council meeting days. Furthermore, keywords seem
to signiﬁcantly drive changes to expectations when they are pronounced in the
event of an interest rate increase (and its communication). In addition, data
releases were found to signiﬁcantly aﬀect the magnitude of changes to rate ex-
pectations. A distinction into data releases by region suggests that data releases
for the US do not reveal any signiﬁcant impact on changes to rate expectations,
whereas data releases for the euro area are fairly important.16
As suggested by summary statistics, Governing Council decisions have a
signiﬁcant impact on rate expectations. In general, changes to the expected
rate level are signiﬁcantly larger on days when the Governing council meets
compared to common trading days. This applies to both meetings when the
policy rate changed as well as meetings when policy rates were left unchanged,
but, quantitatively the impact seems to be much larger in the event of a policy
rate change. Finally, contrary to the RND-based indicators discussed below, the
magnitude of changes to rate level expectations does not reveal a strong degree
of persistence. This applies to both changes in absolute terms as well as in real
terms.
Results from the panel logit ﬁxed-eﬀects speciﬁcation suggest that the like-
lihood of observing an above average change to the mean of rate expectations
is signiﬁcantly higher on monetary policy decision days conﬁrming the results
of the baseline speciﬁcation. More speciﬁcally, our estimates suggest that the
odds of such an above-averagechange are more than twice as high as on common
trading days. It seems that the odds of an above-average change to the mean
of rate expectations are even higher on those days for which the policy decision
led to a rate rise (more than three times as high as on common trading days).
Again, we ﬁnd that the odds of an above-average change are signiﬁcantly lower
shortly prior to a monetary policy decision day. All else equal, 3 days ahead of
Governing Council meetings, the odds of an above-average change to the mean
level of expectations, is approximately 35% below those of a common trading
day. Finally, panel logit estimates suggest that the odds of an above-average
change are signiﬁcantly higher for days on which euro area data are released.
All else equal, the odds of an above-average change to the mean level of expecta-
tions increase by approximately 20% on euro area data release days (compared
to common trading days). On average, the impact of such data releases is some-
what smaller than the one derived for monetary policy decision days.
The dispersion of money market rate expectations
Apart from their impact on the level of interest rate expectations, Eurosytem
communication eﬀorts also aﬀect the dispersion of those expectations. To the
extent that Eurosystem communication is adding new information considered
relevant for the future stance of monetary policy, all else equal, we expect such
announcements to stabilise expectations (i.e. reduce their variance) around their
16Again, these ﬁndings are preliminary and may reﬂect an inappropriate choice of data
releases considered. At this stage, we cannot exclude that a subset of US data releases
nevertheless have a signiﬁcant impact on euro area money market rate expectations whereas
certain euro area data releases may not.
12average level. In order to test for the stabilising impact of Governing Council de-
cisions communicated via the Introductory Statement, we focus on the standard
deviation of market expectations around Governing Council meeting days.
Our results suggest: (a) the standard deviation of rate expectations is highly
persistent. Overall, the autoregressive coeﬃcients up to lag order 3 are highly
signiﬁcant with the exception of the second lag. The sum of auto-regressive
coeﬃcients is approximately 0.9.17 (b) The standard deviation of RNDs is
signiﬁcantly lower on Governing Council days (i.e. at the end of such meeting
days). Furthermore, the lower dispersion of rate expectations ”lasts” up to
3 days. While the standard deviation is also signiﬁcantly lower on the day
following a Governing Council decision, thereafter the reduction disappears.
Moreover, we do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly lower standard deviation of market
expectations on the three days prior to a Governing Council decision.
For the purpose of robustness, a number of alternative estimations were car-
ried out. First, with regard to the dependent variable, we perform similar panel
data regressions for the interquantile ranges of the implied risk-neutral densi-
ties. Our ﬁndings suggest that both narrow interquantile ranges (i.e. 65th-35th
percentile) and broad interquantile ranges (i.e. 75th-25th percentile) are signiﬁ-
cantly lower following Governing Council meetings.18 Second, with regard to the
method used, for both the standard deviation and the interquartile ranges panel
logit estimates are presented. Logit estimates are presented for both the likeli-
hood of an above average standard deviation/interquantile range and an above
median standard deviation/interquantile range. Across all speciﬁcations and for
both dispersion measures considered, we ﬁnd a somewhat lower dispersion on
Governing Council days. For example, the odds of an above average/median
standard deviation decline by roughly 40%-50% on Governing Council days.
Moreover, all speciﬁcations seem to suggest that the impact on dispersion is
relatively short-lived. We ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly lower likelihood of above-average
dispersion on the day following the Council meeting, but not thereafter.19
The (a)symmetry of money market rate expectations
Although, in general, Eurosystem Governing statements do not announce
any form of monetary policy bias, the decisions of the Governing Council may
nevertheless aﬀect the asymmetry of market expectations. Again, our measures
of asymmetry reveal a high degree of persistence (approximately 0.7 to 0.83 de-
17In general, both ﬁxed- and random-eﬀects panel estimators are biased when lagged values
of the dependent variable appear as regressors. In the case of the ﬁxed estimator, each
transformed value of the lagged dependent variable (i.e. the diﬀerence between any given
observation and the mean of the corresponding cross-section) is contemporaneously correlated
with the transformed error. In the case of the random eﬀects estimator, the cross-section
random intercept directly enters the composite error term and becomes a determinant of the
lagged dependent variable. Issues related to the bias induced by a lagged dependent variable
speciﬁcation are typically teckled by means of instrumental variable or GMM estimation (for
an overview of the related literature see Baltagi (2001)). A general conclusion from work
on the size of the bias induced by the lagged dependent variable in a ﬁxed eﬀects panel
speciﬁcation is that for large-T panels (i.e. long panels with T > 30), the bias created by
using the ﬁxed-eﬀects estimator is more than oﬀset by the greater precision compared to IV
and GMM estimators (See Attanasio, Picci, and Scorcu (2000)).
18Contrary to the standard deviation, however, the interquantile results do not suggest a
signiﬁcant impact on the days of the decision themselves.
19See tables 4,5 in apendix B.1.
13pending on measure). Taking into account the new (potentially diﬀerent) level
of interest rates at the end of the Governing Council meeting, the asymmetry
of market expectations may or may not be aﬀected on Governing Council de-
cision days. Obviously, in qualifying the following results, one has to bear in
mind, that the period under study represents a so-called tightening cycle. Thus,
expectations might in general have been skewed towards rising interest rates.
Our results suggest that on governing council days on which the interest
rate was left unchanged, the probability of an increase in the near future usu-
ally increased signiﬁcantly. This was also true for days following such a meeting.
Similarly, the probability of a rate decrease was negatively but not signiﬁcantly
aﬀected on meeting days without a rate decision. On meeting days with a rate
change, an increase in the expectations of another rate hike could not be ob-
served. However, the coeﬃcient on days following such a meeting is close to
signiﬁcance. This might be related to a horizontal movement of the probabil-
ity distribution.20 Similar evidence is given by the regression on the skewness
measure. It appears that skewness is signiﬁcantly reduced on days following
governing council decisions to raise interest rates. This may also be due to a
shifting probability distribution. Interestingly, the probability of a rate decrease
signiﬁcantly declined on days preceding a rate hike. This suggests that decisions
by the governing council to raise rates were usually expected.21
3 Evidence from forward rates
3.1 Deriving implied forward rates
This section analyzes the impact of Eurosystem Governing Council commu-
nication on interest rate expectations across diﬀerent horizons. Interest rate
expectations from the short to the long run are typically derived from implied
forward rates. Forward rates essentially contain the same information as the
yield curve, but they allow a more direct presentation of rate expectations in
the short, the medium and in the long term (Svensson (1994)). Implied forward
rate curves illustrate, for a given time t, the pattern of forward interest rates at
future points in time (say from 3 months to 30 years). In the following, we de-
rive two types of implied forward rates: (a) In section 3.2, implied forward rates
for the short- to medium-term are derived from observed money market rates.
These forward rates can be computed very easily and are exempt from estima-
tion error. They reﬂect the tenor structure of money market rates. However,
implied forward rates directly obtained from observed money-market rates only
extend to one month. (b) In section 3.3, we derive implied instantaneous for-
ward interest rate curves based on the term structure of interest rates observed
in bond/bill markets. Implied instantaneous forward rates are a common way
to derive measures of interest rate expectations and are easier to interpret from
a policy perspective. Unfortunately, their estimates are subject to estimation
error.
On a continuously compounded basis, the implied forward rate on a forward
contract concluded at time t for an investment starting in τ and maturing in T
20As shown above, the level of rate expectations is signiﬁcantly aﬀected by rate decisions.
21For a complete overview see table 6 in the appendix.
14is deﬁned as:
f(t,τ,T) =
[(T − t)z(t,T)] − [(τ − t)z(t,τ)]
(T − τ)
, (9)
with f,z denoting the continuously compounded implied forward rate and the
zero coupon rate respectively.
The instantaneous forward rate is the rate for a forward contract with an




Thus, instantaneous forward rates represent the marginal increase in return
stemming from a marginal increase in duration of the investment.22 Therefore,
the spot rate of an investment at time t, can also be interpreted as an average






The estimation of implied instantaneous forward rates is based on Nelson
and Siegel (1987) and Svensson (1994). While these methods are by and large
atheoretical in nature, they have become standard in the empirical work on
instantaneous forward rates.23 Moreover, the parsimonious modelling of the
yield curve proposed by Nelson and Siegel (1987) can represent a wide range
of shapes typically associated with yield curves (e.g. monotonic, S-shaped and
hump-shaped curves). The extension proposed by Svensson (1994) provides
an even higher degree of functional ﬂexibility by introducing a second hump
shape (or U-shape). We estimate implied forward rates based on the parametric
yield curve models proposed by Svensson (1994). The impact of Eurosystem
Governing Council communication on interest rate expectations is measured
via changes to these expectations.
The parsimonious parametric model ﬁrst suggested by Nelson and Siegel
(1987) speciﬁes a functional form for the instantaneous forward rate based on 4
parameters, b = {β0,β1,β2,τ1}:
















which Svensson (1994) augmented by a fourth term and two additional param-
eters β3 and τ2:

























in order to allow for a second hump and thus more ﬂexibility. f(m,b) stands
for the forward rate on a speciﬁc trading day, b = {β0,β1,β2,β3,τ1,τ2} is the
22Svensson (1994) points out that [...] Whereas the yield curve can be interpreted as expected
future averages of the variables in focus, the forward rate curve can be interpreted as indicating
the expected future time path of these variables.[...].
23See also the series of instantaneous forward rates recently published by the Eurosystem
at www.ecb.int/stats/money/yc/html/index.en.html.
15set of parameters, where β0,β1, β2 and β3 describe the strength of the long-,
short- and medium-term components. τ1 and τ2 are constants determining the
location of the humps. Finally, m = T − t denotes time to maturity.
According to equation (11), for any given set of parameters b, the spot rate
i(t,t + m) can be obtained by integrating the forward rate f(m,b) as:







































Given the spot rate i(t,t+m), for any given parameter set b, one can derive
a set of theoretical bond prices according to the net present value of all coupon
payments and the principal returned upon maturity:
P(t,t + m) =
Z m
k=1
ckd(t,t + k) + pd(t,t + m) (15)
where ck denotes the coupon paid in period k (with k = 1,2,...,m) and p denotes
the principal returned at maturity m. d(t,t +m) denotes the discount function
used to discount all receipts originating from the bond contract.
For any given b = {β0,β1,β2,β3,τ1,τ2}, the discount function d(m,b) (with









The parameters b = {β0,β1,β2,β3,τ1,τ2} can be estimated so as to min-
imise either the price error or the yield error. Minimising yield errors is typ-
ically preferred to minimising price errors, in particular for short-term bonds.
This reﬂects the diﬀerent sensitivity of bond prices to yields along the maturity
spectrum.24 However, UK Debt Management Oﬃce (2000) claims that the min-
imisation of yield errors can improve on the poor estimation for short maturity
bonds, but may lead to a slight deterioration in the ﬁt of the curve at the long
end. Moreover, the minimisation of price errors is frequently applied in order
to reduce the computational burden (see, for example, G¨ urkaynak, Sack, and
Wright (2006)).25 Given the high frequency with which instantaneous forward
rates are computed in this paper, we attenuate the short-maturity bias inherent
in price error minimisation, by applying weights determined by the reciprocal
of duration. G¨ urkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2006) claim that ”[...] this proce-
dure is approximately equal to minimizing the (unweighted) sum of the squared
deviations between the actual and predicted yields on all of the securities [...]”.
The analysis uses daily market data for all outstanding nominal German
and French Treasury bonds and bills as reported by Bloomberg newswire ser-
vices. Again, in order to allow for a suﬃciently close link with monetary policy
24Svensson (1994).
25Bolder and Streliski (1999)
16communication while avoiding a very low signal-to-noise ratio, implied forward
rates are estimated at daily frequency. The dataset entails prices and yields
(ask and bid). As in section 2, the sample period covers all trading days from
mid-July 2005 to mid-July 2007. The restriction to the securities of two euro
area countries is an obvious drawback compared to other studies on instanta-
neous forward rates for the euro area.26 Due to the signiﬁcantly smaller number
of securities considered, our estimates might be more sensitive with regard to
the choice of the starting values and constraints. Nevertheless, by the end of
2003, French and German government bonds represented roughly 40% 27 of all
euro area government bonds in terms of the amount outstanding and they are
typically characterised by a high degree of liquidity. Furthermore, the instan-
taneous forward rates estimated from German and French Treasury bonds and
bills generally were quite close to the more broad-based instantaneous forward
rates estimated by the ECB.28
As with the estimation of RNDs, the computation of instantaneous forward
rates may be subject to local minima in the objective function. In order to
alleviate potential biases due to an inappropriate choice of starting values, we
rely on a series of partial optimisation procedures very much in line with Bolder
and Streliski (1999) are carried out. Throughout the optimisation procedure,
the set of parameter values b = {β0,β1,β2,β3,τ1,τ2} is distinguished into two
groups of parameters, the βs (bβ = {β0,β1,β2,β3}) and the τs (bτ = {τ1,τ2}).
The general idea consists in carrying out a number of optimisations where one
set of parameters is ﬁxed while optimising over the parameters of the other
group (and vice versa). Bolder and Streliski (1999) claim ”[...] the advantages
of estimating one subset of the parameters while holding the other constant are
improved speed of convergence and increased stability [...]”. In order to avoid
that by keeping one subset of parameters ﬁxed the solution is being constrained
from its optimum, two lines of optimisation are carried out. In a ﬁrst (second)
line, as a ﬁrst step, a series of βs (τs) is estimated from a given set of τs (βs).
As a second step, within both optimisation lines we continue by estimating
the same subset of parameters based on new (narrower) starting value matrices
around the best solutions obtained from the ﬁrst step. In a third step of the
ﬁrst (second) line, the subset of parameters is inversed so as to derive optimal
τs (βs) from given βs (τs). In a fourth step, again, the model is estimated for a
narrower grid of the ﬁxed parameters based on the best outcomes obtained in
step 3. In a ﬁfth step, for any given line, the full model is estimated based on
a subset of the best outcomes so far obtained from either step within this line.
Finally, the best solutions from step 5 (from both line 1 and line 2 which overall
26In particular, the instantaneous forward rates recently published by the ECB. However,
the ECB website ﬁgures daily instantaneous forward rates starting from 29 December 2006
only.
27See European Central Bank (2004).
28Overall, across all trading days and for horizons as long as 20 years (i.e. more than 33.000
ﬁtted values), approximately one out of ten estimates deviate by more than 10 bps from the
corresponding ECB ﬁgures. The largest deviations are observed over fairly short horizons
(i.e. less than six months). The reasons for the important spread over short horizons are
several. First, whereas our estimates are based on (weighted) price error minimisation, the
ECB estimates are based on yield error minimisation, thereby potentially leading to more
reliable estimates at the short end. Second, in order to avoid forward curve starting points
being disconnected from the observed level of short-term rates, for any given time t, we require
the estimated instantaneous forward rate at horizon t = 0 to be in an interval of 20-60 bps
below the observed 1-month Euribor rate.
17consist of 5555 outcomes) are retained as the optimal solution. Throughout all
sub-steps of the optimisation a number of upper and lower bounds are imposed
(the most obvious of which require τ1 and τ2 to be positive).






















































Figure 3: Implied instantaneous forward rates over horizons of 1, 2, 5, 10 and
15 years and the policy main reﬁnancing operations rate
3.2 Evidence from implied forward rates
Figure 4 below reports the average change to the implied 1-month money mar-
ket forward rate (from spot to 11 months ahead) in the event of Governing
Council meetings leading to no policy rate change (top panel), meetings leading
to a policy rate change (intermediate panel) and meetings without rate change
but making use of the keyword strong vigilance (bottom panel).29 Governing
Council meetings leading to a rate change (which in our case amounts to a rate
increase) lead to higher spot rates (reﬂecting the small likelihood market par-
ticipants assigned to the ”left unchanged” option) and at the same time lower
the expected 1-month ahead 1-month forward rate (reﬂecting the lower likeli-
hood of a rate rise at the next Governing Council meeting given the rate hike
”today”). In the event of Governing Council meetings with unchanged policy
rates, on average, spot and implied forward rates hardly moved. However, by
making use of the keyword strong vigilance (and in spite of the absence of a
policy rate change) the Governing Council did move implied forward rates quite
substantially. First, use of this keyword drove up the implied 1-month forward
rate 1-month ahead. This might lend support to the assertion that markets
considered the reference to strong vigilance as a signal for a rate hike at the
next Governing Council meeting. Second, it seems that the use of this key-
word shifted rate expectations upwards not only for the next month but also
29The change in money market rates (actual and implied) is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between
the closing price observed on the business day following the Governing Council day and the
business day prior to the Council meeting (i.e. ”2-day diﬀerence”). All numbers reported refer
to the average change based on all Governing Council meetings that took place throughout
the 2-year sample period.
18the months to follow (and more than what was observed for Council meetings
leading to a rate hike).30




Governing Council with unchanged policy rates




Governing Council with policy rate change




Governing Council with strong vigilance
Figure 4: Implied forward rates (1-month): Spot to 11 months ahead
In order to assess the impact of the keyword strong vigilance on short-run
implied rate expectations, the following speciﬁcation is used:
∆f
∗





t−j + β5DOWt + β6IDEvtt + β7IDRelt + eit,
where ∆f∗
t denotes the change in the implied 1-month ahead 1-month forward
rate (both in absolute terms and in real terms). Our results, reported in ap-
pendix 7, suggest that the changes to the implied 1-month ahead 1-month for-
ward rate are signiﬁcantly larger in weeks during which Governing Council meet-
ings are held. They also tend to increase in the week preceding such a meeting,
in particular on days for which data releases are scheduled. Moreover, a rate
hike, all else equal, leads to smaller changes to the implied one-month-ahead
1-month money market forward rate. The use of the keyword strong vigilance
leads to signiﬁcantly larger changes to the implied 1-month-ahead 1-month for-
ward rate, but at the same time smaller changes to the implied two-months-
ahead 1-month forward rate. Similar exercises for the implied 1-month forward
rate further down the road (say 3 to 10 months ahead) did not reveal any sig-
niﬁcant role for the keyword strong vigilance. In sum, it seems that use of the
keyword strong vigilance prompts markets to anticipate a rate rise at (precisely)
the next Governing Council meeting. To the extent that market participants
at no point in time were ”misled” (except in October 2005 when policy rates
were hiked only two months later), this keyword might have improved the (very)
30This holds for all periods except for the 1-month forward rate 2 months ahead. This may
reﬂect the impact rate hikes have on the 1-month forward rate 1 month ahead. Due to the
frequency of rate hikes and the use made of the keyword strong vigilance, the changes to the
forward rate reported for several months ahead may reﬂect the eﬀects the expected rate rise
for the 1-month ahead rate increase have on the subsequent forward rates.
19short term predictability of the Eurosystem monetary policy. However, short-
term predictability does not constitute a monetary policy objective on its own
and may be of very limited use in shaping the understanding of the conduct of
monetary policy.
3.3 Evidence from implied instantaneous forward rates
So far, implied forward rates had been derived from observed money market
rates with monthly tenor structure (up to 12 months). As a consequence, 1-
month forward rates could be computed for horizons from 0 to to 11 months
ahead, measuring expected monthly averages of future short-term interest rates
over a full month period. To derive measures of interest rate expectations that
are easier to interpret from a policy perspective, it is common to estimate im-
plied instantaneous forward rates. This section analyses the impact of Governing
council communication on implied instantaneous forward interest rates.
The left-hand side panel of Figure 5 below illustrates the average magni-
tude of the change to the implied instantaneous forward rate for three types
of trading days (all numbers in absolute terms). On average, we observe sub-
stantially larger changes to implied rates on Governing Council days than on
common trading days. This applies to all horizons up to 20 years, though not
for all medium-term horizons (in particular t = 1.4 to 2.2 years).31 For common
trading days, the largest changes to implied instantaneous rates were observed
at horizon t = 2.2 years. On Governing Council days, by contrast, the largest
changes are obtained for horizons around 9 - 10 months. Relative to changes
on common trading days, around horizons of 6 - 13 months, the average change
on Governing Council days becomes more than 50% larger. Moreover, we ﬁnd
substantially larger changes to instantaneous rate expectations on Governing
Council days for horizons from 2.2 years onwards relative to common trad-
ing days. In addition, data releases also tend to lead to larger implied rate
changes compared to common trading days. Regardless of the horizon, the
average change to rate expectations is larger on days featuring data releases
than on common trading days. On average, in absolute terms, the strongest
impact of data releases on rate expectations is obtained for horizons of 1.5 -
3.5 years, approximately 15-35% above the corresponding mean rate changes
observed for common trading days over comparable horizons.32 The left-hand
side panel of Figure 5 also compares the changes to instantaneous forward rates
obtained on Governing Council days to those observed on days featuring data
releases. As reported in section 2, on average, Governing Council meetings tend
to aﬀect rate expectations more strongly than data releases. For example, for
all horizons between 7 and 14 months (i.e., essentially, the horizon over which
both data releases and Governing Council communication reveal their strongest
impact on rate expectations), the observed change to rate expectations on Gov-
erning Council days has been at least 40 to 70% higher than on data release days.
The right-hand side panel of Figure 5 above illustrates the average daily
change in rate expectations depending on whether, on a given day, the keyword
31As already highlighted in section 3.2, however, estimates for horizons shorter than 3
months, may suﬀer from substantial uncertainty.
32Again, we cannot draw any ﬁrm conclusions for horizons shorter than 3 months.































no mention strong vigilance
strong vigilance
Figure 5: Mean change to implied instantaneous rate by type of trading day (in
absolute terms)
strong vigilance had been uttered (or not).33 Figure 5 suggests that, on average,
the mention of strong vigilance coincides with large changes to rate expectations
for horizons of up to 3.3 years. The largest change to expectations is obtained
for horizons of around 1.5 year. At the 1.5-year horizon, on average, the mention
of strong vigilance lead to rate rise expectations approximately 3.7 times larger
than those on trading days without mention of strong vigilance.34 Of course, this
descriptive evidence needs to be treated with caution as implied instantaneous
forward rates cannot be observed outright and given the very small number of
relevant observations.35
Overall, the above summary statistics seem to suggest that the eﬀects of
Eurosystem communication on implied instantaneous forward rates may diﬀer
accross the interest rate path horizon. Generally speaking, compared to common
trading days, both data releases and Governing Council communication tend to
yield more sizeable changes to interest rate expectations over horizons up to 51
2
years, though they tend to achieve their maximum impact much earlier (up to
11
2 years). Overall, the impact on Governing Council days is much larger than
on data release days, but the impact of data releases is much more equally spread
across horizons. In order to assess whether the daily change in rate expectations
is signiﬁcantly aﬀected on Governing Council days and/or on data release days,
we estimate speciﬁcation (17) below. As we would like to assess whether the
impact of Governing Council communication and euro area data releases is
concentrated around certain horizons, speciﬁcation 17 below is estimated for all
(monthly) horizons up to and including 15 years:
33Note that similar to the preceding sections, hereafter, the keyword strong vigilance is only
considered when mentioned on an Governing Council day. Moreover, the focus here is on the
magnitude of rate expectation changes in non-absolute terms as the mention of strong vigilance
provides market participants with a clear unidirectional beacon concerning the Eurosystem’s
assessment of the outlook for price stability.
34Although, on days when strong vigilance is not used Other keywords may convey a message
broadly similar with regard to the outlook for price stability.
35It is also against the background of the high degree of uncertainty that we have to in-
terpret the below-average impact of the keyword strong vigilance on the daily change to rate
expectations over horizons between 31
2 - 91
2 years as well as the impact this keyword seems






where |∆f|h,t stands for the absolute change in yield for horizon h on day t.
ISDayt is a dummy identifying Governing Council meetings, NRelEAt and
NRelUSt indicate the release of euro area data and US data, respectively.
DOWt controls for day-of-week eﬀects while eh,t is the error term. Figure 6
below reports the coeﬃcients β1,h to β3,h from equation (17) and the respective




























































Figure 6: Coeﬃcients, t-stats and p-values for equation 17 by horizon
Our results suggest that Governing Council meetings signiﬁcantly aﬀect the
day-to-day change in rate expectations. The impact on such days becomes very
strong over horizons from 7 to 13 months. Moreover, we ﬁnd signiﬁcantly larger
changes to rate expectations on such days at horizons between 6 and 15 months
(at the 5% signiﬁcance level). Overall, for a horizon of 1
2 to 11
2 year, it seems
that the change in rate expectations on Governing Council days is signiﬁcant and
substantial. For both shorter and longer horizons, both the magnitude of the
impact and its signiﬁcance decline sharply. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that the change
in rate expectations may also be signiﬁcantly aﬀected on trading days featuring
releases of euro area data. However, contrary to the evidence for Governing
Council meeting days, the impact of such releases (to the extent signiﬁcant)
seems to be less concentrated at one horizon but is evenly distributed from the
short to the medium term. Overall, our results suggest a signiﬁcantly larger
change to rate expectations for horizons of roughly 6 months to 4 years (again,
22at the 5% signiﬁcance level). However, as already suggested by the summary
statistics reported above, the magnitude of the eﬀect on the change of rate
expectations is much smaller than the impact obtained on Governing Council
meeting days. Finally, our results suggest that the change to rate expectations
is not signiﬁcantly aﬀected on days featuring US data releases. This applies to
all monthly horizons up to and including 15 years.
The longer horizons over which euro area data releases were found to signif-
icantly aﬀect changes to implied forward rates (relative to Governing Council
days) might reﬂect that within the framework of a fully credible and (short-
term) predictable monetary policy, macroeconomic data remain a primary de-
terminant of medium-term expectations about the policy rate. However, more
generally, the results with regard to the role of data releases (both for the euro
area and the US) may be due to their lump-sum treatment within this paper.
In particular, we cannot exclude that a more detailed treatment of data releases
(e.g. by type of data released, by their qualitative implication for the outlook
for price stability and/or according to the extent the ﬁgures released had been
anticipated by market participants) may lead to results diﬀerent from those
reported here. Overall, the overriding impact on market participants’ rate ex-
pectations over the last two years seems to have originated in the communication
of the Eurosystem’s monetary policy decisions. The impact of monetary policy
decisions, both in terms of magnitude and signiﬁcance, seems to be particularly




This paper set out to assess the impact of oﬃcial Eurosystem Governing Council
communication on ﬁnancial markets using evidence from futures markets, op-
tions markets and bond markets. The most important ﬁndings based on both
RNDs and implied forward rates suggest that Eurosystem Governing Council
meetings are an important driver of interest rate expectations.
First, estimates based on RNDs suggest that the level, the dispersion and the
asymmetry of interest rate expectations are signiﬁcantly aﬀected on Eurosystem
Governing Council meeting days. However, some of the impacts observed on
Governing Council meeting days, such as a signiﬁcantly lower dispersion of rate
expectations, tend to be relatively short-lived. Moreover, we ﬁnd that interest
rate expectations tend to become less volatile during the black out period.
Second, monetary policy meetings tend to aﬀect interest rate expectations
much more strongly than data releases. We do ﬁnd a signiﬁcant impact of euro
area data releases, but US data releases do not seem to aﬀect euro area inter-
est rate expectations systematically. However, we cannot exclude a signiﬁcant
impact of speciﬁc US data releases, depending on the type of data released, the
extent to which the ﬁgures had been anticipated by market participants and/or
on their qualitative implications for the outlook for risks to price stability.
Third, evidence from implied instantaneous forward rates suggests that mon-
etary policy decisions and data releases may have fairly diﬀerent implications
for interest rate expectations, depending on the horizon of such expectations.
The impact of monetary policy decisions seems to be particularly concentrated
36For the full set of results, please refer to Appendix B.2.
23around horizon of 1
2 - 11
2 years, while the eﬀects of euro area data releases seem
to unfold at medium-term horizons.
Fourth, it seems that the use of keywords within the Eurosystem’s monetary
policy mimics the merits and the limits of central bank predictability. On the-
oretical grounds, the case for increased short-run predictability is fairly strong.
All else equal, more short-term guidance is expected to lead to a smooth transi-
tion of the money market towards a situation of diﬀerent rate levels. Evidence
from implied forward rates suggests that keywords do contribute to the (very)
short-run predictability of the Eurosystem monetary policy with a particularly
strong impact on interest rate expectations over the 1-2 month horizon. By
contrast, keywords do not seem to have a systematic impact on interest rate
expectations over longer horizons, which might reﬂect the ambiguous role of
forward guidance over medium- to longer-term horizons. On the one hand, for-
ward guidance is supposed to anchor the public’s long-term expectations and
contribute to the understanding of monetary policy. On the other hand, the Eu-
rosystem’s monetary policy is conditional on a broad assessment of the outlook
for risks to price stability and its underlying assumptions and scenarios. This
conditionality might not be fully understood by market participants and forward
guidance over the medium term might be mis-interpreted as a precommitment
by the central bank to a speciﬁc interest rate trajectory even in the emergence
of scenarios diﬀerent from the benchmark. Deviations from the forward guided
policy path, although perfectly justiﬁed, may be mis-interpreted as a policy fail-
ure and ultimately lead to lower credibility of the central bank. Overall, given a
high degree of short-term predictability of the Eurosystem monetary policy, this
might explain why the impact of Eurosystem Governing Council communica-
tion on interest rate expectations is concentrated on the short- to medium-term,
giving a more important role to data releases over the medium term.
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26Appendix
A Data releases considered
Country Data type Country Data type
EC Unemployment US Unemployment
EC PPI US ISM Non-Manufacturing
EC Retail sales US Conﬁdence (Uni of Michigan)
EC ZEW US Retail Sales
EC CPI US Trade balance
EC Industrial production US CPI
EC Business conﬁdence US Industrial Production
EC Consumer conﬁdence US PPI
EC GDP sa US Consumer Conﬁdence
EC Trade balance sa US ISM Manufacturing
GE IFO Business Climate US ISM Prices Paid
GE IFO Current Assessment US Change in NFP
GE IFO Expectations
Table 1: Indicators from Bloomberg Newswire. Ifo-Indices were counted as
Eurozone Indicators
27B Regression results
B.1 Regressions using risk neutral density indicators
The regressors nrelea and nrelus refer to news releases concerning the Euro
area and the US respectively ocurring on a certain day. is and isup indicate
that a rate decision and a rate increase have occurred. dist next and dist prec
indicate the distance in days until/since the next/preceding meeting. keynbr
counts how many of the four keywords occurred during the communication of
the rate decision.
key indicates the overall number of keywords that were uttered per day.
nrel summarizes nrelea and nrelus. Idow [1-5] are Day-of-week dummies. ttm
stands for the term to maturity in days of a speciﬁc option. The dependant
variable df0abs designates the absolute price change of the underlying future.
For logit regressions the variables med[variable] indicate whether the value of
a certain variable exceeded its sample median (in which case the value switches
from 0 to 1).
iq[....] measures the interquartile (or interpercentile) range. For example
iq5545 subtracts the 45th percentile from the 55th percentile. iq[....]l[1-4] are
the lags of this variable. sdx is the standard deviation of the distribution while
sdxl[1-3] represent its lags. isl[1-3] are the lags of introductory statement days,
while isld[1-3] are the lead variables. iscum summarizes is and isl1. Similarly
nreleal1 is the lag of Euro area news releases. ttmmth is the term-to-maturity
months as unit.
The variables up[XX] and dn[XX] indicate the estimated expectations of a
rate increase of XX base points. skewx indicates the third standardized moment
of the distribution of expectations while skewxl[1-4] are its lags. isupl[1-2] and
isupld[1-2] are lags and leads of governing council meetings with a rate increase
while isNOup indicates governing council meetings with a constant rate and
isNOupl[1-2] are lags.
28Linear regressions / Term-to-maturity absorbed
df0abs Coef. t-stat p-val. df0abs Coef. t-stat p-val.
nrelea 0.0039 5.5526 0.000 nrelea 0.0038 5.4157 0.000
is 0.0103 3.8395 0.000 dist next -0.0027 -3.3443 0.001
dist next -0.0026 -2.9051 0.004 keyis 0.0137 6.126 0.000
dist prec -0.0005 -0.5636 0.573 key -0.0002 -0.1648 0.869
keynbr 0.0018 1.9891 0.047 cons 0.0226 48.899 0.000
cons 0.0224 39.9472 0.000
df0abs Coef. t-stat p-val. df0large Coef. t-stat p-val.
nrelea 0.0039 5.5104 0.000 nrelea 0.0435 2.5519 0.011
is 0.0068 3.0541 0.002 dist prec 0.0393 1.8007 0.072
dist next -0.0026 -3.3124 0.001 keyis 0.1788 2.7941 0.005
isup 0.0203 5.036 0.000 isup 0.272 3.6454 0.000
cons 0.0225 51.8381 0.000 nrelus 0.0271 1.6279 0.104
dist next2 -0.0989 -2.5766 0.010
cons 0.3767 28.6533 0.000
Logit panel regression
df0large Coef. z-stat p-val.
nrelea 1.186 2.3943 0.017
is 1.417 1.5689 0.117
dist next 0.978 -0.2272 0.820
dist prec 1.213 2.0555 0.040
isup 3.562 3.3144 0.001
nrelus 1.122 1.6726 0.094
Table 2: Level of rates - part 1
29Linear regression / Option absorbed
df0abs Coeﬀ. t-stat. p-val. Coeﬀ. t-stat. p-val. Coeﬀ. t-stat. p-val.
key -0.0014 -1.25 0.212 -0.0012 -1.07 0.283 -0.0014 -1.23 0.220
nrel 0.0027 3.84 0.000 0.0024 3.08 0.002
is 0.0141 6.05 0.000 0.0141 6.1 0.000 0.0137 5.7 0.000
dist next -0.0026 -3.69 0.000 -0.0029 -3.93 0.000 -0.0025 -3.57 0.000
nrelea 0.0037 5 0.000
Idow 2 0.0004 0.42 0.678
Idow 3 -0.0011 -1.08 0.281
Idow 4 0.0009 0.84 0.404
Idow 5 0.0022 1.76 0.079
cons 0.0226 38.08 0.000 0.0229 47.52 0.000 0.0223 28.83 0.000
df0abs Coeﬀ. t-stat. p-val. Coeﬀ. t-stat. p-val. Coeﬀ. t-stat. p-val.
key -0.0012 -1.03 0.302
is 0.0135 5.7 0.000 0.0105 3.81 0.000 0.0105 3.81 0.000
dist next -0.0028 -3.86 0.000 -0.0025 -3.48 0.001 -0.0025 -3.5 0.000
nrelea 0.0036 4.97 0.000 0.0037 5.13 0.000 0.0038 5.07 0.000
Idow 2 0.0003 0.33 0.740 0.0002 0.19 0.848 0.0002 0.21 0.833
Idow 3 -0.001 -1.06 0.288 -0.0012 -1.19 0.235 -0.0012 -1.14 0.253
Idow 4 0.0011 1.07 0.284 0.0009 0.87 0.385 0.0009 0.86 0.392
Idow 5 0.0026 2.25 0.024 0.0025 2.19 0.028 0.0025 2.01 0.045
keynbr 0.001 1.05 0.292 0.001 1.05 0.294
nrelus -0.0001 -0.1 0.920
cons 0.0223 29.39 0.000 0.022 29.14 0.000 0.022 28.87 0.000
df0abs Coeﬀ. t-stat. p-val. Coeﬀ. t-stat. p-val. Coeﬀ. t-stat. p-val.
is 0.0087 3.32 0.001 0.0062 2.88 0.004 0.0062 2.88 0.004
dist next -0.002 -2.81 0.005 -0.0024 -3.43 0.001 -0.0024 -3.43 0.001
nrelea 0.0038 5.21 0.000 0.0038 5.25 0.000 0.0038 5.25 0.000
keynbr 0.0021 2.33 0.020
nrelus 0.0004 0.62 0.537 0.0006 0.89 0.372 0.0006 0.89 0.372
df0lag1 0.0438 2.45 0.014
ttm 0.00003 15.06 0.000 0.00003 16.59 0.000 0.00003 16.59 0.000
keyisup 0.021 5.41 0.000
isup 0.021 5.41 0.000
cons 0.0083 9.53 0.000 0.0093 11.1 0.000 0.0093 11.1 0.000
df0abs Coeﬀ. t-stat. p-val.
key -0.0011 -1.02 0.307
is 0.0066 2.62 0.009
dist next -0.0028 -3.87 0.000
nrelea 0.0036 5.02 0.000
Idow 2 0.0003 0.33 0.743
Idow 3 -0.0012 -1.17 0.240
Idow 4 0.0013 1.2 0.231
Idow 5 0.0026 2.25 0.024
isup 0.0204 5.03 0.000
cons 0.0223 29.39 0.000
Table 3: Level of rates - part 2
30Linear Regressions / ttmmth absorbed
iq5545 Coeﬀ. t-stat. p-val. iq6535 Coeﬀ. t-stat. p-val.
iq5545l1 0.5538 4.43 0.000 is -0.0049 -3.02 0.003
iq5545l2 0.1278 1.42 0.157 isl1 -0.0055 -3.75 0.000
iq5545l3 0.1143 1.99 0.046 isl2 0 0.00 0.998
iq5545l4 0.0989 2.16 0.031 isl3 -0.0037 -2.51 0.012
is -0.0026 -2.66 0.008 nrelea -0.001 -1.63 0.104
isl1 -0.0029 -3.90 0.000 iq6535l1 0.5463 7.25 0.000
isl2 0.0009 0.46 0.648 iq6535l2 0.132 1.97 0.049
isl3 -0.0026 -2.47 0.013 iq6535l3 0.1629 2.48 0.013
nrelea -0.0006 -1.59 0.112 iq6535l4 0.089 1.75 0.080
cons 0.0116 3.37 0.001 cons 0.0153 3.93 0.000
iq7525 Coeﬀ. t-stat. p-val. sdx Coeﬀ. t-stat. p-val.
is -0.0061 -3.02 0.003 nrelea 0.0008 0.83 0.409
isl1 -0.0078 -3.77 0.000 sdxl1 0.5083 3.77 0.000
isl2 -0.0003 -0.13 0.900 sdxl2 0.1113 0.91 0.365
isl3 -0.0042 -2.73 0.006 sdxl3 0.3334 2.44 0.015
nrelea -0.0013 -1.54 0.123 iscum -0.0077 -3.71 0.000
iq7525l1 0.5693 7.12 0.000 key -0.0022 -1.77 0.077
iq7525l2 0.1898 2.29 0.022 cons 0.0206 2.28 0.023
iq7525l3 0.0399 0.59 0.552
iq7525l4 0.1341 2.68 0.007
cons 0.0223 3.73 0.000
sdx Coeﬀ. t-stat. p-val. sdx Coeﬀ. t-stat. p-val.
is -0.0045 -1.22 0.221 is -0.01 -3.45 0.001
isl1 -0.0084 -3.55 0.000 isl1 -0.0093 -3.77 0.000
nrelea 0.0008 0.90 0.367 isl2 -0.0064 -2.48 0.013
sdxl1 0.5077 3.77 0.000 isl3 -0.0041 -2.55 0.011
sdxl2 0.1118 0.91 0.364 nrelea 0.0009 0.92 0.358
sdxl3 0.3326 2.44 0.015 sdxl1 0.505 3.73 0.000
vig 0.0007 0.40 0.692 sdxl2 0.1081 0.88 0.379
accn -0.0021 -1.19 0.234 sdxl3 0.3407 2.49 0.013
mon -0.0066 -2.00 0.045 isld1 0.0017 0.58 0.560
wtd 0.0024 0.69 0.489 isld2 0.0006 0.32 0.747
cons 0.0209 2.30 0.022 isld3 -0.003 -0.80 0.422
cons 0.0207 2.25 0.025
sdxlarge Coeﬀ. t-stat. p-val. Coeﬀ. t-stat. p-val.
is -0.035 -0.89 0.376
isl1 -0.041 -1.01 0.314
isl2 -0.0019 -0.05 0.962
isl3 0.0008 0.02 0.984
nrelea 0.0032 0.19 0.853
nreleal1 0.0112 0.65 0.513
nrelus 0.0089 0.51 0.613
cons 0.5189 36.86 0.000
Table 4: Dispersion of expectations - part 1
31Logit panel regressions
iq5545large Coeﬀ. z-stat. p-val. iq6535large Coeﬀ. z-stat. p-val.
iq5545larg 1 12.46589 17.65 0.000 iq6535larg 1 14.80316 18.3 0.000
iq5545larg 2 4.151645 8.65 0.000 iq6535larg 2 3.948315 7.91 0.000
iq5545larg 3 2.262739 4.56 0.000 iq6535larg 3 2.096634 3.94 0.000
iq5545larg 4 3.069003 6.63 0.000 iq6535larg 4 3.316575 6.81 0.000
isup 1.66013 0.78 0.438 isup 1.454494 0.59 0.556
is 0.5417165 -1.76 0.079 is 0.4345792 -2.33 0.020
isl1 0.9056037 -0.32 0.753 isl1 1.186936 0.53 0.593
nrelea 0.7499275 -2.12 0.034 nrelea 0.7137758 -2.41 0.016
nrelus 1.085223 0.6 0.549 nrelus 1.172439 1.14 0.255
iq7525large Coeﬀ. z-stat. p-val. mediq5545l e Coeﬀ. z-stat. p-val.
iq7525larg 1 19.53616 19.36 0.000 mediq5545l 1 9.784451 17.83 0.000
iq7525larg 2 3.385255 6.43 0.000 mediq5545l 2 3.838709 9.34 0.000
iq7525larg 3 2.042825 3.43 0.001 mediq5545l 3 2.488424 5.97 0.000
iq7525larg 4 3.252909 6.22 0.000 mediq5545l 4 2.780109 6.99 0.000
is 0.6705585 -1.24 0.214 isup 1.688242 0.89 0.373
isl1 0.8055908 -0.65 0.515 is 0.6603429 -1.2 0.231
nrelea 0.799883 -1.54 0.123 isl1 0.7101428 -1.19 0.235
nrelus 1.226796 1.41 0.160 nrelea 0.9273822 -0.61 0.539
nrelus 1.107508 0.82 0.410
mediq6535l e Coeﬀ. z-stat. p-val. mediq7525l e Coeﬀ. z-stat. p-val.
mediq6535l 1 11.1395 18.29 0.000 mediq7525l 1 11.1488 18.49 0.000
mediq6535l 2 3.900884 9.1 0.000 mediq7525l 2 3.930742 9.25 0.000
mediq6535l 3 2.277371 5.18 0.000 mediq7525l 3 2.23407 5.13 0.000
mediq6535l 4 2.943555 7.19 0.000 mediq7525l 4 2.789212 6.87 0.000
is 0.8998759 -0.37 0.713 is 0.9239734 -0.28 0.781
isl1 0.7168585 -1.13 0.257 isl1 0.8873138 -0.41 0.680
isl2 2.537926 3.25 0.001 isl2 1.981144 2.34 0.019
nrelea 0.8930508 -0.9 0.369 nrelea 0.8244041 -1.55 0.122
nrelus 1.159849 1.15 0.249 nrelus 1.052862 0.4 0.686
Table 5: Dispersion of expectations - part 2
32Linear Regression / ttmmth absorbed
up25 Coeﬀ. t-stat. p-val. dn25 Coeﬀ. t-stat. p-val.
up25l1 0.8186 29.94 0.000 dn25l1 0.725 18.14 0.000
isup 0.0018 0.42 0.675 isup 0.0065 1.64 0.101
isupl1 0.0095 1.93 0.053 isupl1 -0.0018 -0.50 0.616
isupl2 -0.0047 -1.22 0.222 isupl2 -0.0012 -0.44 0.657
isupld1 0.0052 1.45 0.146 isupld1 -0.0037 -1.40 0.163
isupld2 -0.0065 -1.53 0.126 isupld2 -0.0001 -0.03 0.979
isNOup 0.0114 2.16 0.031 isNOup -0.0025 -0.43 0.669
isNOupl1 0.0077 2.09 0.037 isNOupl1 -0.0022 -0.85 0.394
isNOupl2 0.0004 0.16 0.872 isNOupl2 0.0007 0.31 0.754
nrelea 0.0009 0.73 0.466 nrelea 0.0001 0.06 0.951
cons 0.045 6.56 0.000 cons 0.0705 6.92 0.000
up50 Coeﬀ. t-stat. p-val. dn50 Coeﬀ. t-stat. p-val.
up50l1 0.799 24.89 0.000 dn50l1 0.7311 18.73 0.000
isup -0.001 -0.17 0.865 isup 0.0064 1.25 0.211
isupl1 0.0137 1.98 0.048 isupl1 -0.0083 -1.72 0.085
isupl2 -0.0045 -1.05 0.295 isupl2 0.0016 0.52 0.600
isupld1 0.0068 1.39 0.164 isupld1 -0.0063 -2.07 0.038
isupld2 -0.0001 -0.02 0.982 isupld2 0 0.00 0.999
isNOup 0.0111 2.17 0.03 isNOup -0.0072 -1.30 0.192
isNOupl1 0.0066 2.15 0.032 isNOupl1 -0.0041 -1.61 0.107
isNOupl2 0.0016 0.76 0.445 isNOupl2 0.0015 0.57 0.570
nrelea 0.0007 0.63 0.532 nrelea 0 0.03 0.973
cons 0.0711 6.19 0.000 cons 0.102 6.93 0.000
skewx Coeﬀ. t-stat. p-val.
isup 0.017 0.49 0.624
isupl1 -0.073 -1.98 0.048
isupl2 0.008 0.32 0.750
nrelea 0.001 0.07 0.946
skewxl1 0.572 10.42 0.000
skewxl2 0.158 2.90 0.004
skewxl3 0.024 0.38 0.704
skewxl4 0.12 2.63 0.009
nrelus -0.008 -0.86 0.391
cons 0.042 4.11 0.000
Table 6: Asymmetry of expectations
33B.2 Regressions using implied forward rates
sv indicates use of strong vigilance during an introductory statement. preweek
indicates the week preceeding the governing council and isweek stands for the
calendar week during which the council met. The [ ]release variables indicate
news releases that occurred during those time periods. dist embargo covers the
timeperiod of the communication embargo preceding governing council meetings
of the ECB. thuy is a dummy variable indicating thursdays.
|∆f| 1 month ahead
coeﬀ. t-stat p-value
lag 1 0.1629 3.66 0
sv 0.0122 2.84 0.005
preweekrelease 0.0047 2.21 0.028
preweek 0.0025 1.62 0.107
isweek 0.0057 3.59 0
isweekrelease -0.0041 -1.91 0.056
cons 0.0041 5.35 0
∆f 1 month ahead
coeﬀ. t-stat p-value
sv 0.0139 2.85 0.004
preweekrelease 0.0077 3.51 0
lag 1 0.1276 3 0.003
isup -0.0121 -2.51 0.012
Idow 2 -0.0019 -1 0.317
Idow 3 -0.0012 -0.68 0.5
Idow 4 0.004 2.1 0.036
Idow 5 -0.0044 -2.33 0.02
nrelea -0.0006 -0.47 0.642
cons 0.0037 2.8 0.005
∆f 2 months ahead
coeﬀ. t-stat p-value
sv -0.011 -2.16 0.031
isup 0.004 0.79 0.429
nrelea 0.0015 1.24 0.216
dist embargo 0.0029 2.27 0.024
thuy 0.002 1.24 0.214
cons 0.0024 2.61 0.009
Table 7: Results for observed 1-month forward rates according to speciﬁcation
(17)
n ea is short for nrelea.
34Coeﬃcients / t-stats accross horizons
Coeﬃcients t-stat Coeﬃcients t-stat
mths. GovC n ea GovC n ea mths. GovC n ea GovC n ea
3 9.7 7.41 0.96 1.84 39 6.67 4.89 1.2 2.2
4 11.26 6.91 1.28 1.97 40 6.97 4.88 1.25 2.2
5 12.73 6.31 1.78 2.21 41 7.25 4.86 1.31 2.2
6 14.21 5.02 2.55 2.26 42 7.49 4.84 1.36 2.2
7 17.31 4.4 3.86 2.46 43 7.72 4.82 1.4 2.19
8 18.98 4.17 4.54 2.5 44 7.92 4.78 1.44 2.18
9 19.54 4.41 4.41 2.5 45 8.08 4.73 1.47 2.16
10 19.41 4.73 4.06 2.48 46 8.16 4.63 1.49 2.13
11 18.46 4.75 3.57 2.31 47 8.21 4.52 1.51 2.09
12 17.14 4.54 3.11 2.07 48 8.25 4.41 1.53 2.05
13 15.49 4.51 2.69 1.97 49 8.28 4.3 1.54 2
14 13.74 4.56 2.33 1.94 50 8.29 4.19 1.54 1.96
15 11.84 4.64 1.99 1.95 51 8.28 4.08 1.55 1.92
16 9.93 4.78 1.67 2.01 52 8.34 4 1.56 1.88
17 8.13 4.95 1.37 2.09 53 8.42 3.9 1.58 1.84
18 6.72 5.02 1.14 2.14 54 8.47 3.79 1.6 1.8
19 5.28 5.1 0.91 2.2 55 8.5 3.68 1.61 1.75
20 3.87 5.16 0.67 2.24 56 8.5 3.55 1.62 1.7
21 2.52 5.2 0.44 2.28 57 8.45 3.47 1.62 1.67
22 1.72 5.21 0.3 2.29 58 8.39 3.41 1.61 1.64
23 1.61 5.17 0.28 2.28 59 8.31 3.34 1.61 1.62
24 1.6 5.02 0.28 2.23 60 8.22 3.27 1.6 1.6
25 1.74 4.79 0.31 2.13 61 8.12 3.21 1.59 1.57
26 1.87 4.59 0.33 2.04 62 8.01 3.13 1.57 1.54
27 1.97 4.43 0.35 1.97 63 7.88 3.04 1.55 1.5
28 2.09 4.42 0.37 1.96 64 7.75 2.95 1.53 1.47
29 2.3 4.42 0.41 1.97 65 7.6 2.88 1.51 1.44
30 2.58 4.43 0.46 1.97 66 7.45 2.8 1.49 1.4
31 3.13 4.44 0.55 1.98 67 7.28 2.73 1.46 1.37
32 3.66 4.48 0.65 2 68 7.1 2.67 1.43 1.34
33 4.17 4.53 0.74 2.02 69 6.91 2.62 1.39 1.32
34 4.67 4.58 0.83 2.04 70 6.7 2.57 1.36 1.31
35 5.14 4.67 0.91 2.08 71 6.49 2.54 1.32 1.3
36 5.56 4.77 0.99 2.13 72 6.27 2.52 1.28 1.29
37 5.96 4.85 1.06 2.17 73 6.04 2.49 1.23 1.28
38 6.33 4.88 1.13 2.19 74 5.81 2.48 1.19 1.27
Table 8: Evolution of coeﬃcients and t-stats for IS-days and EA news releases
over the spectrum of horizons according to speciﬁcation (17). The dependant
variable is |∆f|. To improve readability, coeﬃcients were multiplied by 10∗ e5.
(See also Figure 6.)
35